I examine the effects of one side falsely signaling its ability (and thus its probability of eventual victory) in a military conßict. I consider the effect on the probability of victory, the length of the battle, and the total number of casualties. I answer these questions in a setting in which individual soldiers are decision makers: Each decides whether to surrender or keep Þghting at every stage of the battle. This is in contrast to a more naïve model in which a central decision maker (the general) controls each individual's action. I Þnd that disinformation always increases the sender's probability of victory but can increase the duration and expected deaths if the sender is sufficiently inferior and the disinformation is not extreme. * I thank Keith Head for valuable discussions.
Introduction
Prior to and during the war between the U.S. and Iraq in 2003, a widely discussed component of U.S. strategy was "shock and awe." Such a strategy comprises several elements, the combined aim of which is to achieve "rapid dominance" over an enemy.
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In the popular understanding, effective use of shock and awe would result in the war essentially ending before it began: that the Iraqi army would be so intimidated by U.S. forces that they would lay down their arms immediately. When this did not happen-when the war had not come to an end within a few days-a common view was that the shock and awe strategy had not been successful. 2 This view, however, takes a narrow view of success. One could construe the strategy to be successful, at least to some degree, if it has the effect of shortening the war or lessening the loss of life, or if it simply improves the probability of a U.S. victory. At the same time, it is possible that these measures are at odds with each other; for example, a strategy that increases one side's probability of victory may also increase the expected duration of the war and the expected loss of life. A careful analysis is necessary to weigh these effects.
This paper considers the effects of one aspect of shock and awe: misleading the opposing side regarding one's military ability. 3 A key issue in analyzing the effects of such disinformation is how we model the behavior of the agents who receive the information. One very simple view, which I call the command-and-control (CC) model, assumes that there is only one decision maker on each side of the conßict; a general gives orders to the soldiers, who must then follow them. An alternative view is to consider each individual soldier as a decision maker: At each stage of the battle, each soldier decides whether or not to Þght. In this view, soldiers are economic agents in the sense that they perceive a cost and a beneÞt of Þghting (discussed in the following section). This model carries implications of disinformation that do not exist in the CC model. For example, in the CC model, it is virtually impossible for disinformation to have any effect unless the disinformation is severe enough to induce total surrender of the opposing side at the beginning of the conßict. When we view soldiers as individual decision makers, the effects of disinformation are not necessarily as stark. Furthermore, these effects are not always obvious. Disinformation always increases one side's probability of victory, but it can either increase or decrease the expected loss of life and duration of the conßict. Which way this goes depends on the relative strength of the side that spreads false information and how strong the disinformation is.
There is a substantial literature dealing with aggregation of public information. 4 In this literature, individual agents have private information about some common value. In this paper, the informational structure is much simpler: At any time, all soldiers on one side of a conßict have the same information about a common value, the opposing side's ability. The complexity arises from the interaction between the inference of the other side's ability and the individual decisions of whether to Þght or surrender. There can be a cascading effect of surrendering-if some soldiers on one side surrender, the remaining soldiers are more vulnerable to the opposing side and are thus more likely to surrender-which is analogous to an information cascade, but only superÞcially. There is also a literature concerning the sending of false information, 5 where the issue is what actions one player can take in order to induce an incorrect inference on the part of another player. I do not consider the mechanism by which false information is communicated; I simply assume that one side is able to 4 See, for example, Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al (1992) , and Gul and Lundholm (1995) . 5 See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) .
manipulate the opponent's prior belief of its ability, and examine the effects of this. 
Theoretical model
For each side (i = 1, 2), there are n it soldiers alive in period t (I will suppress t when there is no ambiguity in doing so), where the initial value of n it is large. 6 The
Þghting ability of the soldiers on each side is a i > 0, and the valor of soldier k on side i is v ik , where 0 < v ik < 1. 
where f is the probability of being killed and β > 0 is a lethality parameter. As the technology of warfare improves, β increases (e.g. β would be higher if soldiers
Þght with guns rather than swords). I will use f i to denote f (a i , n i , a j , n j , β) , and similarly for f j . Desirable properties for f include the following:
It will be convenient to make two further assumptions. First, f (a i , n i , a j , n j , β) = f (a i , xn i , a j , xn j , β) for all x > 0. This implies that we may consider only the relative numbers of soldiers on each side in Þguring the probability of death. Second,
This says that lethality magniÞes the effect of ability. Given that f is restricted to be between 0 and 1, there is no sensible way for there to be separable effects of β and a i . Below I point out which results depend on the latter two assumptions.
Soldiers on side j have a prior belief of the ability of soldiers on side i, b a i . I assume that side i may be able to manipulate b a i , but I do not model the process through which this happens. I deÞne disinformation to be the difference between the sender's true ability and the receiver's prior:
where d i ≥ 0. There may be costs or other factors limiting d i ; I simply take the extent of disinformation to be exogenous. The prior is updated over the course of battle, as soldiers observe the numbers of deaths and surrenders on each side. In this updating, the prior is given weight w against new information, reßecting the persistence of the informational distortion. For w = 0, the prior becomes irrelevant as soon as there has been one period of battle from which to draw information, and for w = ∞, the prior is never updated. At any stage, the updated belief is a it . All parameters except a i and a j are common knowledge, and soldiers on side j can infer a it for all t.
The order of the game is as follows:
Stage 0: All soldiers observe n i and n j and choose whether to Þght or surrender; soldiers Þght and possibly die; committed his troops to battle, will never withdraw them (so that the only way a battle ends is if everyone on one side is killed), this means the stopping rule is 1.
I will contrast the results below with the implications of the CC model. Some of the same implications follow, but much of the subtlety is lost.
Simulation and results
A large number of simulations was run, using different parameter ranges and different functional speciÞcations for the probability of death and the distribution of valor. 
where 0 < v < 1 and λ i , λ j > 0. Also for most runs, the probability of death is 7 The simulation was performed using R, a software package primarily used for statistical computation and graphics. This package is amenable to this kind of simulation, and is particularly useful for displaying results in such a way as to be interpretable. Full details are available from the author.
where A = n i /n j and B = 1 if n i > n j , and A = 1 and B = n j /n i if n j > n i . The micro foundation for this is the following: Soldiers divide up into cells with one soldier on one side and some (possibly non-integer) number of soldiers on the other side. E.g.
In the surrender stage, the simulation cycles through all active soldiers on each side and determines which choose to surrender. Since each individual's surrender decision depends on the surrender decisions of others, this process is repeated until a
Þxed point is found. At each iteration, each active soldier has an expectation of the number of surrenders on the other side based on the (possibly incorrect) belief about the other side's ability and assumes that the number of surrenders on his own side will be the total number of such surrenders from the previous iteration. 8 In the Þghting stage, the simulation cycles through all active soldiers (those who were alive at the end of the previous round and have not surrendered) to determine whether each individual is killed. In the belief-updating stage, the simulation employs the following simpliÞcation. For each round, there is a one-period estimate of the ability of each side. This is the estimate that soldiers on side i would make for a j based on the observed surrenders and deaths in that round, as if no other information were available. The estimate that is used in the surrender decision, a it , is a weighted average of the prior and the one-period estimates from rounds 1 through t − 1. The persistence parameter, w, is the weight given to the prior. Although not as precise as a maximum-likelihood estimation, there is no systematic bias, and it is computationally far less intensive. Also, a key aspect of this model is that, as a battle progresses, one side's expected belief about the other side's ability approaches the true value. The particular method of updating is not of much consequence.
In an attempt to obtain results along the lines of comparative statics, I cycle through one parameter at a time. For example, I Þx all parameters except β, and observe how the endogenous variables (probability of victory for each side, expected duration, and expected number of surrenders and deaths) vary with β. The probability of victory can be deduced from the fraction of times a particular side wins, and the remaining variables can easily be tracked as the simulation proceeds.
Throughout the simulation I have generally assumed that the two armies are initially the same size. Varying the relative sizes of the armies has essentially the same effect as varying the relative abilities; for ease of exposition, I have assumed n i0 = n j0 in the results below in order to focus on differences in ability. 9 Note also that, since this is a simulation, anything is possible in theory. An interesting result is that the number of deaths (for both sides) is generally decreasing in lethality; i.e., an exogenous increase in the probability of death for any individual results in fewer deaths overall. The reason for this is that the increase in the probability of death also increases the individual's propensity to surrender, and there is always an opportunity to surrender before being exposed to the possibility of death.
Result 1 When prior beliefs are correct (
, the total number of deaths on each side is nonincreasing in the lethality, β.
For low values of β, if the armies are evenly matched, most soldiers on both sides will die. Individuals are willing to Þght because there is very little chance of being killed in any given round. Thus the two sides Þght and decrease each other's numbers bit by bit until one side has enough of an advantage that the other side gives up. A typical relationship between β and deaths on either side is depicted in Figure 1 .
The result also holds, at least weakly, no matter what the relative abilities of the two sides are. In cases where one side's ability is much greater than the other side's, the battle may end in the Þrst round because all soldiers on the inferior side surrender immediately. It will always be the case that all soldiers on one side surrender immediately for β sufficiently large: When faced with a near-certain death, even the bravest soldier will choose not to Þght. For some critical value of β, the total number of deaths is equal to zero, and this does not change as β increases from there.
For a theoretical argument supporting this result, see the appendix. Deaths are also decreasing in lethality in the CC model. At any point in the battle, higher lethality increases the general's propensity to surrender the remaining troops. The surrender effect dominates the direct effect on deaths for the same reason as above.
However, the lethality result does not necessarily hold in the presence of disinformation, as we will see below.
Distorted prior beliefs Now I assume that one side is able to distort its opponent's prior belief of its ability. I assume that disinformation is always successful in that it does induce an incorrect belief, at least temporarily. There could be costs or constraints associated with disinformation that are not modeled here.
As in the previous subsection, some results are very intuitive. Disinformation generally increases an army's probability of victory. If one side is so inferior that the other side is certain to win, a small amount of disinformation on the part of the inferior army will not change the outcome. However, disinformation cannot possibly decrease the sender's probability of victory. In less extreme cases, there are initially more surrenders on the inferior side than there would be under the correct prior belief. Because of this, in successive rounds, the inferior side is smaller, leading to more surrenders on the inferior side and fewer on the superior side. Those soldiers on the inferior side that decide to Þght are more likely to be killed, but for the same reasoning as in the lethality result above, the surrender effect dominates. Since the disinformation increases attrition of the inferior side, the duration of the battle is shorter. Soldiers on the superior side are more likely to Þght, but only because they are less likely to be killed. The only way that more on the superior side would die would be if the duration of the battle were longer.
The difficulty in making this argument more rigorous arises from the impossibility of obtaining an explicit expression for the expected duration.
Result 3
If a i ≥ a j , then as d i increases:
• the expected number of deaths on each side is nonincreasing in d i
• the expected number of surrenders on side i (side j) is nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in d i
• the expected duration is nonincreasing in d i . The preliminary phase contributes additional rounds and deaths to the main battle.
For more severe disinformation, on the other hand, the inferior side's informational advantage never dissipates entirely; the battle ends during the preliminary phase.
Result 4 If a i < a j , the expected number of surrenders on side i (side j) is nonin-
Result 5 If a i < a j , then there exists d * such that the following hold.
• the expected number of deaths on each side is nondecreasing in d i
• the expected duration is nondecreasing in d i .
• the expected duration is nonincreasing in d i . Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between disinformation and deaths on the inferior side. The Þgure corresponds to a scenario in which there is sufficient difference in abilities that, without disinformation, all soldiers on the inferior side surrender in the Þrst round. In such a case, it is straightforward to see that adding disinformation will increase the total number of deaths on each side; for a sufficient degree of disinformation, there is at least one round of Þghting. Similarly, for a very high degree of disinformation, all soldiers on the superior side surrender in the Þrst round, and for a somewhat lesser degree of disinformation there is at least one round of Þghting.
However, an explicit solution is not obtainable, again because of the problem in identifying an explicit expression for expected duration. Whether disinformation shortens or lengthens the battle is crucial in determining the effect on expected deaths. The continuous version of the model is not useful here because of the potentially opposing effects on duration and deaths in any given round.
The effects of lethality are also more complicated than above if the inferior army is the sender of disinformation. Increasing lethality always causes more surrenders on the superior side and fewer deaths on the inferior side, by the same reasoning behind Result 1. If lethality is low, then increasing lethality increases the number of surrenders on the inferior side and increases the number of deaths on the superior side;
i.e. the effect on inferior surrenders is the same as in the case of no disinformation, but the effect on superior deaths is reversed. This is because, for small increases in β in this region, the number of superior surrenders increases slightly but the number of inferior surrenders increases more dramatically. If lethality is high, then increasing lethality decreases the number of surrenders on the inferior side and decreases the number of deaths on the superior side; the effect on inferior surrenders is reversed, and the effect on superior deaths is the same as in the case of no disinformation. This is because, for small increases in β in this region, the number of superior surrenders increases substantially, which makes soldiers on the inferior side more willing to Þght. (i) For β < β * :
• the expected number of surrenders on side i is nondecreasing in β
• the expected number of deaths on side j is nondecreasing in β.
(ii) For β > β * :
• the expected number of surrenders on side i is nonincreasing in β
• the expected number of deaths on side j is nonincreasing in β. 
Conclusion
In analyzing the effects of disinformation in military conßicts, it is important to recognize that individual soldiers have the ability to decide whether or not to Þght at any point in the battle, since the purpose of a "shock and awe" strategy is to send disinformation in an attempt to discourage enemy soldiers from Þghting. Individual high enough that the most cowardly of the four soldiers, on side 1, will surrender if his comrade is killed. There is now an additional scenario in which the battle ends: if no one on side 2 is killed and the braver soldier on side 1 is killed. Since there is now a positive probability that one soldier will surrender, the expected number of deaths on side 1 is lower (subject to the caveat below). As β increases further, the number of situations in which some soldier will surrender increases, and the expected number of surrenders increases. This serves to decrease the expected number of deaths.
There is one complication to the above argument. Say β is large enough that the soldier with the lowest valor will surrender if he is alone on his side, but small enough that there are no other situations in which anyone will surrender. The battle will end if the braver soldier on side 1 is killed, but it is also possible that both soldiers on side 1 are killed at the same time. Increasing β increases the probability that the latter will happen. In other words, increasing the lethality increases the likelihood that deaths in the last round of Þghting will be strictly greater than the number necessary to induce surrender of the remaining soldiers on one side. This effect tends to increase the expected number of deaths; however, it becomes negligible as n increases. Increasing β increases the expected number of surrenders in every round-although soldiers that
Þght are more likely to die, they always have a chance to surrender Þrst-and can increase the expected number of deaths in the last round only. For n large, the former effect dominates the latter.
Result 2: Probability of victory is increasing in disinformation Let p it (n it , n jt ) be the probability that side i wins given the number of remaining soldiers on each side at time t. Let r it = > 0. Now, increasing d i increases the expected surrenders on side j and decreases the expected surrenders on side i in any round of the battle. There is also an indirect effect in that, going into successive rounds, there are more active soldiers on side i and fewer on side j. Therefore, given the assumptions on f, in successive rounds f j is higher. There may also be more deaths on side i, but this is only because there are fewer surrenders; given that surrenders precede deaths, there is no possible way for the number of active soldiers on side i to decrease. With respect to the ratio of n i to n j , the direct and indirect effects of increasing d i are in the same direction. > 0, we have ∂p it ∂d i > 0 for every t, including t = 0.
Note also that, when d i > 0, side j begins the battle with an incorrect prior, but this belief is updated throughout the battle. We could interpret this as d it approaching zero as t increases. All that matters for the above argument is d it ≥ 0 for all t, and the inequality is strict for at least one t. Even if the prior belief is given the least possible weight, disinformation has an effect in the Þrst round and increases the sender's probability of victory. 
